Towards a Sustainable FTAA: DOes Latin America Meet the Necessary Financial Preconditions? by Liliana Rojas-Suarez




TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FTAA: 
DOES LATIN AMERICA MEET  






Visiting Fellow, Institute for International Economics 
Nonresident Fellow, Center for Global Development 
 
 
   Abstract 
This paper focuses on identifying preconditions that will ensure the sustainability of a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA). It argues that the macro, micro, and political conditions advanced in the literature to 
measure a country’s ability to compete internationally, while necessary, are not sufficient to ensure the 
success and permanence of a free trade agreement. Instead, two additional financial conditions are needed. 
The first is that each partner in the free trade area needs to have sustainable public debts as determined by 
the achievement of credible and sustainable structural fiscal balances. The second is that exchange rate 
regimes across trading partners should be compatible in the sense that adverse shocks in one country do 
not generate a policy dilemma in other partners between abandoning their exchange rate system or the free 
trade area.  
         A preliminary analysis of the evidence in the Latin American and Caribbean region shows the 
importance of these two preconditions. An analysis of debt sustainability reveals that there are a number of 
countries in the region that need to deal with potential solvency problems before reaching the status of 
credible partners in a regional trade arrangement. Argentina is already deemed insolvent, and countries 
such as Ecuador and Venezuela rank high on the list of countries where the issue of debt sustainability can 
become a serious problem. Not resolving this before reaching a regional trade agreement can threaten its 
long-term stability. 
         The examination of the compatibility of exchange rate systems across trading partners is also very 
revealing. Part of the success of NAFTA since the late 1990s and the “impasse” of Mercosur during 1999-
2001 had to do with the choices of exchange rate regimes. In both trade areas the share of trade among the 
partners is very high, and in NAFTA, this includes significant financial transactions. While Mexico was 
able to use the flexibility of the exchange rate to improve competitiveness following the sharp decline of 
portfolio flows from US investors into Mexico following the Asian and Russian crises, Argentina had no 
mechanisms to deal with an adverse shock from Brazil (such as a depreciation of the real in 1999). From 
this perspective, the recent move of Argentina towards a more flexible exchange rate system is good news 
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  I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the feasibility and sustainability of regional trade integration in the 
Americas as envisaged by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
The benefits from achieving regional trade integration in the Americas have been 
discussed extensively.
1 In a nutshell, the eventual elimination of trade barriers is expected to 
generate large increases in trade and investment flows that would benefit all member countries. 
To many, regional trade integration is perceived not only as a natural element of the process of 
globalization but also as an essential ingredient to reach the ultimate goal of sustained growth and 
development that has proved so elusive for most of the countries in the region.
2 
It is well-known that the vision of regional integration in Latin America is an old one, 
whose origins can be traced back to the so-called “Bolivar’s dream” of a unified Latin America in 
the 19
th century.  Initiatives for sub-regional free trade arrangements abounded during the 20
th 
century.
3 However, due to either insufficient commitment among governments involved and/or 
inconsistent policies among trading partners, most of these efforts cannot be classified as 
successful. It took the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by Canada, 
Mexico, and the United States in 1992, to clearly demonstrate the potential and long-lasting 
benefits of trade integration. NAFTA also made Latin American countries realize that a less 
developed member of a free trade agreement with industrialized economies can reap significant 
benefits from such a partnership.
4  
The increasing interest in the “trade agreements model” as an alternative approach to 
sustained growth in Latin American countries has also been motivated by recent developments in 
international capital markets. To a significant extent, economic growth during most of the 1990s 
in the Latin America and the Caribbean region (LAC) was sustained by large net private capital 
inflows. These inflows allowed for a combination of trade deficits and accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves in the region. Since the eruption of the emerging-market crisis in the late 
1990s, however, net private inflows in the region (especially portfolio flows) have decreased 
                                                            
1.  See, for example, Iglesias (2001), Schott (2001), and Pastor (2001). 
2.  In the words of the president of the Inter-American Development Bank, “Regional integration is not an 
end in itself but is an instrument to support a strategy of economic growth and development.” 
3.  A comprehensive account of these initiatives is contained in Iglesias (2001). 
4.  Some of the most impressive achievements attributed to NAFTA include: (a) a more than double 
increase in exports among the three trading partners, (b) a dramatic decrease in the dependence of Mexico’s 
exports on oil (while in the early 1980s oil accounted for more than 70 percent of exports, in the late 1990s 
that ratio had been reduced to only 5.5 percent), (c) a surge in investment flows among the three countries, 
and (d) an impressive increase in net creation of jobs (new jobs related to NAFTA overwhelmingly 
surpassed jobs lost associated with the trade agreement. These issues are extensively discussed in 
Weintraub  (1997) and Hinojosa et al. (2000). 
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dramatically. (See chart 1.) Recollections of the so-called “lost decade of Latin America” during 
the 1980s, when the region lost access to private sources of external capital, linger in the memory 
of policymakers. During the 1980s the average annual rate of economic growth reached a mere 1 
percent, with several years recording negative growth. Trade surpluses financed the transfers of 
resources abroad to service large accumulations of debt.   
Forecasts of capital flows to LAC are not encouraging. For example the IMF (2002) 
forecasted that total net private flows in 2002 will decrease significantly with respect to their 
level in 2001 (US$27.1 billion vs US$37.7 billion). Moreover, net private portfolio investment 
into the region is forecast to reach about US$7.6 billion. This figure compares with an average of 
over US$20 billion in the mid-1990s.  
The renewed interest by a number of policymakers in LAC in the trade integration 
approach is, therefore, consistent with the current adverse international financial environment.
5 
After all, as learned from the experience of NAFTA, successful trade agreements have been an 
efficient mechanism to attract sustained inflows of foreign direct investment.
6  
 












Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2002). 
 
                                                            
5.  The 2002 debt crisis in Argentina further aggravated the international financial environment facing LAC 
countries. Financial-market jitters in mid-2002 over forthcoming elections added to this. 
6.  Evidence from Mexico is a case in point. Even facing a sharp fall in the ratio of growth of exports 
during 2001 (largely due to the recession in the United States), foreign direct investment toward Mexico 
Net Private Capital Flows to LAC













The process towards trade integration has furthermore benefited from two developments 
in late 2001-02: the agreement in Doha for a new round of world trade negotiations and 
significant (albeit slow) progress towards the approval of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to 
the US President (formerly known as “Fast Track”).
7  The importance of TPA approval for the 
multiplicity of bilateral trade agreements between LAC countries and the United States, and 
ultimately for the achievement of FTAA, cannot be overstated. The approval of TPA would be 
the strongest signal in recent years of US commitment towards free trade, and several countries in 
LAC, therefore, may be encouraged to accelerate FTAA negotiations. After all, gaining political 
consensus, both in governments and congresses in the region, about the key importance of free 
trade agreements for sustainable growth, is what is needed for the completion of FTAA 
negotiations by 2005.
8 
However, even if commitment towards an FTAA is gained and the negotiations are 
actually concluded in 2005, what guarantees that such an agreement will be successful and 
permanent? After all, Latin America is full of experiments of trade negotiations that, after a short 
period of enthusiasm, were eventually either abandoned or given a very low priority on the policy 
agenda. In other words, what are the preconditions for the sustainability of an FTAA even if 
negotiations are completed by 2005? 
This paper argues that certain policy requirements are needed at the country level to 
ensure the permanence of an FTAA. The basic premise behind the need for these requirements is 
that a policy regime, such as a free trade area, will not be permanent if adverse and unanticipated 
shocks create strong incentives to abandon the regime.
9 In identifying key prerequisites for a 
sustainable FTAA, this paper complements previous studies that focus on testing whether 
countries in the LAC region are economically and politically prepared to meet the demands of an 
FTAA.  
While recognizing that a number of macro, micro, and political variables identified in 
previous studies are essential, this paper argues that there are additional financial conditions 
                                                                                                                                                                             
remained strong. In other words, perceived temporary adverse effects affecting exports do not seem to 
distract investors from the potential permanent benefits of long-term investment. 
7. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) allows the US president to negotiate trade deals and bring them back 
to Congress for an expedited, up-or-down vote. Amendments are not allowed. 
8.  For example, Brazil had made the approval of fast-track authority a condition for engaging in serious 
FTAA negotiations. 
9.  We can draw a parallel with the need to satisfy certain pre-conditions for the stability of a fixed 
exchange rate regime. For example, a country following a fixed exchange rate system will find it very 
troublesome to defend the peg in the presence of an adverse shock if the country’s banking system is weak. 
The reason is that to defend the parity the authorities may need to increase domestic interest rates, which in 
turn would hurt already fragile banks. Experience shows that if forced to choose, most countries would let   5
necessary to preserve the sustainability of the trade integration efforts. The paper claims that 
these additional preconditions are: (a) sustainable public debts as determined by the achievement 
of “credible” and “sustainable” structural fiscal balances and (b) compatible exchange rate 
regimes across trading partners. The paper argues that studies failing to evaluate progress towards 
reaching these conditions will not be able to appropriately assess individual countries’ capacity to 
join the FTAA on a sustainable basis. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II justifies the need for identifying 
financial prerequisites ensuring the sustainability of trade integration efforts and elaborates on 
them. Section III empirically examines whether countries in the LAC are satisfying these 
requisites. Section IV concludes the paper. 
 
II.  NECESSARY FINANCIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR FTAA SUSTAINABILITY 
The need to identify policies that ensure FTAA sustainability arises from the nature of the 
proposed agreement. In contrast to other more comprehensive regional integration efforts, such as 
the European Union, the FTAA does not envisage the creation of regional institutions to deal with 
collective problems. As is NAFTA, the proposed FTAA is only a trade area, not a “community” 
sharing common rules in a variety of economic aspects beside trade. In analyzing NAFTA, Pastor 
(2001) has stressed the important shortcomings that derive from the absence of supra-national 
institutions able to enforce policy decisions aimed at ensuring the continuous improvement of the 
integration arrangement. Pastor argues that a major shortcoming in the NAFTA charter is that it 
assumes that the social, economic, and political consequences of dismantling trade and 
investment barriers will be trivial. In his own words, “NAFTA…overlooked the concept of 
externalities…that markets generate unintended but costly social, environmental, and political 
consequences” (Pastor 2001, 5). I fully agree and argue that similar, but even larger problems 
would arise with an FTAA—simply by the sheer diversity of the large number of countries 
involved. 
However, while I concur with those analysts strongly supporting the creation of 
supranational institutions,
10 I take a more pragmatic view and assume that such supranational 
institutions will not be in the making in the medium term; the political consensus needed for the 
creation of such institutions does not exist. Instead, I ask what policy actions at the national level 
could allow for the sustainability of free trade in the Western Hemisphere. It is my view, that in 
the absence of supranational institutions with enforcement powers to ensure the permanence of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the peg go rather than creating a financial collapse. It follows, therefore, that a key pre-condition for a 
stable peg is a sound banking system.    6
the regional integration process by dealing with the externalities, it is vital for policymakers in the 
region to identify essential conditions for FTAA sustainability. 
This section has two parts. The first part summarizes recent research about economic and 
political conditions in the LAC region that have been identified as necessary for countries to 
effectively lift trade barriers and, therefore, to successfully join a free trade area. The second part 
proposes two additional financial conditions necessary to secure not only the ability of a country 
to join a trade agreement but to make such an arrangement sustainable. 
 
What Can We Conclude from Recent Research About the Appropriateness of Economic 
and Political Conditions in LAC Countries to Join Free Trade Agreements? 
 
As stated in the introduction, this paper should be seen as a complement to previous studies that 
have tested whether countries in the LAC region are prepared, both in economic and political 
terms, to join an FTAA. The most comprehensive analyses can be found in Hufbauer and Schott 
(1994) and Schott (2001). The authors develop “readiness indicators”, a set of macro (price 
stability, budget discipline, national savings, external debt and currency stability), microeconomic 
(government’s reliance on market-oriented policies and on trade taxes as a form of tax revenue) 
and political (index of political rights and civil liberties, index of health, education and per-capita 
income) variables that, when combined, allow for the assessment of “the capacity of a country to 
compete in the global market place” (Schott, 2001, 17).
11 Countries can then be ranked according 











                                                                                                                                                                             
10.  Including, among others, Grinspun and Kreklewich (2001), Grubel (2001) and Pastor (2001). 
11.  The basic idea in the Hufbauer and Schott papers is that the more stable a country is in terms of its 
economic performance and the more advanced a social agenda is in terms of securing human rights and 
social services, the more “ready” it is to join the FTAA.    7
Table 1    Alternative ranking of LAC countries according to  
                 economic/ political advances in reform 
              
Schott (2001):    World Economic     Lora (2001)
3 
Readiness    Forum (2001):     Index of 
Indicator
2    Growth Competitiveness                   Structural 
      Index
1    Reform
3 
               
Barbados  1    Chile  1    Bolivia  1 
Chile  2    Costa Rica  2    Jamaica  2 
Uruguay  3    Trinidad & Tobago  3    Peru  3 
Costa Rica  4    Mexico  4    Trinidad & Tobago  4 
Trinidad & Tobago  5    Uruguay  5    Argentina  5 
Mexico  6    Dominican Republic  6    Brazil  6 
Argentina  7    Brazil  7    Chile  7 
Bahamas, The  8    Panama  8    Dominican Republic  8 
El Salvador  9    Jamaica  9    Nicaragua  9 
Venezuela, RB  10    Argentina  10    Guatemala  10 
Panama  11    El Salvador  11    Paraguay  11 
Bolivia  12    Peru  12    El Salvador  13 
Grenada  13    Venezuela, RB  13    Colombia  14 
Paraguay  14    Colombia  14    Costa Rica  15 
Peru  15    Guatemala  15    Ecuador  16 
Colombia  16    Bolivia  16    Venezuela, RB  17 
Belize  17    Ecuador  17    Honduras  18 
Honduras  18    Honduras  18    Mexico  18 
St. Lucia  19    Paraguay  19    Uruguay  19 
Dominican Republic  20    Nicaragua  20       
Dominica  21             
Brazil  22             
St. Kitts & Nevis  23             
Jamaica  24             
St Vincent and Gren.  25             
Guatemala  26             
Guyana  27             
Antigua & Barbuda  28             
Ecuador  29             
Nicaragua  30             
Suriname  31             
Haiti  32             
               
1. The Growth Competitiveness Index is formed by three sub-indices: (a) macroeconomic 
environment index; (b) public institutions index; (c)  technology index.   
2. Schott's readiness indicator is composed of three sub-indices: (a) macroeconomic 
indicator;  (b) market indicator replicating the government's reliance on market-oriented 
policies and on trade taxes for tax revenue collection; (c) policy sustainability indicator. 
  3. Lora’s index of structural reforms is a simple average of five sub-indices in the 
following areas: (a) commercial policy; (b) financial policy; (c) tax policy; (d) 
privatization; (e) labor policy.  The index is calculated every year during the period 
1995-99. The data presented corresponds to 1999. 
 
   
 Sources: World Economic Forum (2001); Schott (2001); Lora (2001).     
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While not focusing particularly on the FTAA, the World Economic Forum (WEF 2001) 
produced the “Growth Competitiveness Index”, an indicator aimed at identifying the factors 
explaining a country’s ability to produce efficiently goods and services at international standards 
of technology and quality. The index is produced by a combination of three sets of variables:  
(a) those affecting the quality of the macroeconomic environment (inflation, interest rate spreads, 
fiscal stance, national savings rate), (b) those affecting the quality of public institutions (the 
quality of “property rights, the rule of law” and the degree of corruption) and (c) those reflecting 
technological progress (companies’ investment in R&D, level of tertiary education, degree of 
“absorption” of foreign technology, degree of advance in information and communication 
technology). The LAC countries included in this study are ranked according to this index in 
column 2 of table 1. 
 Not surprisingly, there is significant overlapping between some of the variables in 
Schott’s “readiness indicator” and the WEF “competitiveness index,” particularly among the 
macroeconomic variables. Indeed, as appendix I shows, the similarities between these 
macroeconomic stability indices are large enough to have important coincidences in the ranking 
of countries, especially at the top and bottom of the ranking.
12  The key difference between the 
two indicators, and an important contributor explaining the different ordering of countries in the 
“overall indicators,” is the inclusion of “technology” variables in WEF.  
In contrast to Schott and WEF, Lora’s (2001) index of structural reform does not aim 
directly at measuring and comparing countries’ capacities to compete internationally. Lora’s 
objective is to assess the depth of policy reforms in five areas: (a) commercial policy,  
(b) financial policy, (c) tax policy, (d) privatization, and (e) labor policy
13. This index can, 
therefore, be seen as a complement to the “market-oriented policies” indicator in Schott. The 
ranking of countries according to the index of structural reforms is presented in column 3  
of table 1. 
Due to the narrower scope of the Lora’s study, rankings of countries based on the index 
of structural reform are not comparable with those of Schott and WEF. For the latter two, 
however, there are both impressive similarities and quite contrasting results in the rankings. For 
example, excluding from the Schott sample the countries not included in the WEF study, the five 
best performers are the same (but in different order) in the two alternative studies (Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, and Uruguay). There is also agreement that Nicaragua and 
Ecuador are the worst performers, and therefore, the least ready to join the FTAA (see table 1). 
                                                            
12. Out of the six best performers in terms of macroeconomic stability, four countries are common to both 
indices. Similarly, five out of the seven worst performers are common to both indices. See appendix I.   9
On the other hand, the two indices rank Brazil, the largest partner in the proposed FTAA, very 
differently. While Brazil takes position number 7 in the WEF ranking, it goes all the way down to 
position 16 in Schott’s (when including only countries ranked by both indices). Likewise, 
Venezuela takes the 8
th position in Schott’s ranking (also including only countries ranked by both 
indices), while it is classified in the 13
th position by the WEF methodology.  Albeit at different 
degrees of discrepancies, there is no consensus about the relative position of the rest of the 
countries in the LAC region. 
A comparison between studies, therefore, reveals that a small number of countries can be 
identified as economies either in the “relative best” or the “relative worst” position to compete 
internationally, while sharp differences persist regarding the relative “competitiveness” position 
of the majority of countries in LAC. Notice, however, that, as late as 2001, none of these studies 
classified Argentina as a “bad performer”. Indeed, Argentina ranked 7
th in Schott’s (out of 32 
countries), 10
th in the WEF ranking (out of 20 countries) and 5
th in the Lora’s index (out of 19 
countries). Based on the overwhelming problems that affected Argentina since 1999 that ended in 
the country’s debt default in early 2002 and the deepest economic crisis in recent Latin American 
history, Argentina should have been ranked low for “readiness”. What has been missing in 
current research that prevent the identification of severe potential problems to “credibly” join the 
FTAA? This is the subject of the next section. 
 
Further Conditions Needed to Ensure Successful and Sustainable Free Trade Agreements 
While I recognize that the variables identified by recent research are necessary to assess the 
capacity of a country to join a free trade area, I argue that those variables are not sufficient to 
ensure the sustainability of an integration effort. As stated in the introduction, the experience in 
Latin America has repeatedly shown that policy regimes often are abandoned after large and 
adverse unanticipated shocks create incentives to reverse existent policies, even when these 
policies involve international agreements.
14  I, therefore, suggest that two additional policy 
requirements, both aimed at containing incentives to break the rules under a free trade agreement, 
need to be satisfied. The first is sustainable public debts as determined by the achievement of 
credible and sustainable structural fiscal balances. The second is compatible exchange rate 
systems across trading partners. I now proceed to expand on these two policy conditions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13. To my knowledge this is the most complete study of advances in the reform process in the LAC region.      
14.  As stated by Iglesias (2001), most of the early post-war trade agreements in Latin America “fell into 
open crisis in the 1980s” (128). This is not surprising as the 1980s can be characterized as the worst crisis 
period (in terms of both duration and intensity) in recent Latin American history.    10
Sustainable Public Debts 
My claim that the criterion of credible and sustainable public debts is essential for the success of 
trade agreements in the LAC region is based on its long history of crises: From the debt crisis of 
1982 to the tequila crisis of 1994-95 to the ongoing crisis in Argentina, a common root can be 
identified: unsustainable public debts.  
To use a more recent episode, take, for example, the so-called “impasse” in Mercosur in 
2000-01, just before Argentina’s default.
15 Confronted with increasing problems in servicing its 
public debt (external and internal), Argentina’s authorities faced during the period 2000-01 
serious pressures for either abandoning or at least relaxing tariff commitments under Mercosur. 
To those opposed to the trade agreement, it was difficult to understand why the Argentine 
government did not increase revenues from external trade sufficiently to compensate for the sharp 
reduction in domestic tax collection that accompanied the deep recession that had inflicted the 
country for three consecutive years.
16 Regardless of the pros and cons of that argument, the key 
issue is that a major policy inconsistency, such as unsustainable public debt, provides strong 
political incentives to deviate from integration agreements when it is perceived that the costs from 
such accords exceed their benefits.  
It is important to define what is meant here by public debt sustainability. After all, the 
recent studies surveyed in the previous section include several indicators of fiscal stability: fiscal 
deficit as percentage of GDP and external debt as percentage of exports in Schott’s readiness 
indicator and levels of public spending in the WEF competitiveness index. The concept of public 
debt sustainability used here has two components. The first relates to a country’s capacity to 
service its debt on a sustainable basis, and the second refers to a country’s willingness to service 
its obligation. The first component involves using the well-known methodology advanced by 
Blanchard and further elaborated by Talvi and Vegh (1998). They define public debt as being 
sustainable if, under reasonable assumptions of economic growth and interest rates, a country is 
able to generate structural primary fiscal balances that would allow keeping constant the ratio of 
debt to GDP. The structural primary fiscal balance is obtained by stripping the cyclical or 
temporary components from the observed primary balance results. An important benefit of this 
methodology is that it eliminates large one-time events that temporarily inflate government 
revenues and, therefore, could give the impression of sustainability to debt services that are 
unsustainable in the medium-term.
17 
                                                            
15.  See, Intal (2001). 
16.  Indeed, in 1999 Argentina increased tariffs on a number of items.  
17.  As will be discussed in the next section, Venezuela, where the fiscal stance is highly dependent on the 
very volatile price of oil, is a case in point.   11
A key reason for my preferring this indicator of a country’s capacity to service its debt 
over traditional ratios of fiscal soundness, such as debt to exports or debt to GDP (ratios used in 
the Schott and WEF studies), is that although these ratios have the benefit of being easy to 
calculate and readily available, they can be seriously misleading at a given point in time. Take 
Argentina once again. Throughout the long gestation period of the Argentine crisis (1999-2001)  
it was not unusual to hear some analysts claim that the country did not have a debt problem. The 
argument was that the ratio of government debt to GDP in Argentina (49 percent by end 2000) 
was much smaller than that of several developed countries, such as Italy (111 percent by end 
2000)! The obvious mistake made by supporters of this argument is that they ignored that what 
matters is not the stock of debt itself but the overall capacity of the country to service that debt, 
and that such servicing capacity depends crucially on the country’s ability to maintain continuous 
access to the international capital markets. While industrialized countries (a category that 
includes Italy) do not confront “sudden stops” of capital inflows when facing economic 
difficulties, lack of access to private external sources of finance has been a typical feature of  
LAC countries during crises.  
The second component of the concept of debt sustainability used here, namely, the 
country’s willingness to pay, is related to market perceptions about the government’s political 
attitude toward its creditors. International perceptions about a country’s “creditworthiness,” as 
manifested in the spread between the yield on sovereign bonds and the yield on US Treasury 
bonds, reflect not only the market estimation about a country’s capacity to generate necessary 
fiscal surpluses to service its obligations but also the government’s commitment to sustain these 
balances and to use the proceeds to pay its liabilities. 
I believe that this second component of debt sustainability is as important as the first 
component. Consider the example of Brazil in mid-2002. As will be shown in section II, it is easy 
to demonstrate that Brazil was moving towards a sustainable debt path, from the point of view of 
establishing its capacity to pay. However, in early June of 2002, electoral polls showed a 
significant increase in the probability of a presidential candidate, Mr. da Silva  (Lula) to win the 
elections later that year. Because the markets perceived Mr. Lula as a “populist,” fears developed 
about a potential future Brazilian government’s commitment to continue on a sustainable debt 
path.
18 By end-June 2002, spreads on sovereign bonds had skyrocketed. The extremely high 
spreads raised the country’s external financing costs and limited the availability of external 
sources of finance. The consequent balance of payments pressures translated into a depreciation 
                                                            
18. “Lula” had also stated in the past that Brazil should default on its debt.   12
of the exchange rate, which, in turn, aggravated the debt situation (due to the large proportion of 
dollar-denominated debt) and required further fiscal adjustments. 
At the time of this writing, it was too early to know how the Brazilian story would end, 
but the basic message from this experience is that due to deteriorated perceptions of 
creditworthiness (in the Brazilian case, due not to the current but to the expected actions of a 
future government) a country may find itself “willing to prove the market wrong.” In that 
situation, incentives for finding additional sources of government revenue will emerge because of 
the need to raise funds to continue servicing the government debt. Pressures for abandoning a 
“low tariff approach” may develop, risking the sustainability of a free trade agreement. 
Evidence on debt sustainability based on the concepts discussed above will be presented 
for a selected sample of LAC countries in section III. I will then analyze how use of these criteria 
affects the conclusions from previous studies regarding the capacity of a country to join (and I 
add, on a sustainable basis) a free trade area. 
  
Compatible Exchange Rate Regimes Across Trading Partners 
Can a regional trade area be sustainable if its members follow different exchange rate regimes? 
This highly debatable question has resulted in quite different answers.
19 To some, integration 
arrangements need to share a common currency to be sustainable.
20 These analysts base their 
assessment on the experience of the European Union. The currency crisis of the ERM (Exchange 
Rate Mechanism) in 1992 is cited to demonstrate that not even a fixed exchange rate system is 
sufficient to ensure the stability of an integration process; instead trade integration is perceived as 
the first step towards higher degrees of economic and financial integration, culminating in the 
adoption of a single currency. 
 To others, however, all of the integration advances in the LAC region, whether NAFTA, 
the Andean Community or the FTAA, are just efforts towards free trade areas, with no 
intention—so far—of establishing a common market a la European Union and, even less, a 
monetary union. This latter view is held by most governments in LAC and by multilateral 
organizations. The straightforward conclusion from this view is that countries are free to choose 
their exchange rate system and that such choices need not impose a constraint on the success of 
an FTAA. 
                                                            
19.  For an analysis of a number of issues related to this subject, see Fernandez-Arias et al. (2002). 
20.  See, for example, Grubel (1999).     13
I do not fully agree with either of the above two conclusions. While I believe that 
different exchange rate regimes can co-exist within the proposed FTAA, I think that there are 
some incompatibilities that need to be avoided. 
Once again, recent events in Mercosur come in handy to illustrate my point on how such 
incompatibilities may arise. While, by no means, one can put the blame of Argentina’s financial 
crisis on the Brazilian devaluation of 1999, it is certainly clear that the chosen exchange rate 
regimes of the two trading partners between 1999 and 2001 (a totally fixed exchange rate system, 
through the convertibility law, in Argentina and a flexible exchange rate regime in Brazil) was a 
call for potential trouble that, on a number of occasions, came close to undermining the 
sustainability of the trade agreement.
21  
A convergence of “adverse shocks” hit Argentina in 1998-99. First, the Argentine peso, 
pegged one-to-one to the US dollar, experienced a large real appreciation, thus hurting its ability 
to compete against its major trading partner: Europe. Partly due to the loss of international 
competitiveness, Argentina entered a recession and domestic investment declined significantly. 
Second, in the midst of the recession, Brazil devalued its currency against the US dollar. The 
devaluation implied that Brazilian consumers found imports from Argentina relatively more 
expensive, while Brazilian products became relatively cheaper to Argentinean consumers. Since 
Brazil is the second largest trading partner for Argentina, the Brazilian devaluation hit Argentina 
by further curtailing its sources of growth and, therefore, exacerbated the recession. 
This event brought heated academic and political discussions: were Mercosur and the 
important share of Argentina’s trade with Brazil the culprits for Argentina’s exacerbated 
problems or was Argentina’s convertibility the straitjacket that did not allow Argentina to regain 
competitiveness? To some, the problem even had a “moral” dimension: was the Brazilian change 
of exchange rate regime (it had a “crawling band” before 1999) “fair” to Argentina in the context 
of Mercosur? 
While different views will certainly remain about this episode, the lesson that I derive is 
that two trading partners on the opposite extremes of the exchange rate-regime spectrum  (fully 
fixed and fully flexible) can only be sustainable if each has a quite diversified trade pattern, that 
is, trades extensively with other countries. If, by contrast, there is high interdependence in trade 
between the two partners, the trade arrangement will tend not to be sustainable as an adverse 
shock hitting the flexible exchange rate country will severely affect the fixed exchange rate 
                                                            
21.  In early 2002, Argentina abandoned the convertibility law and moved to a managed float of its 
exchange rate.   14
partner. This would create incentives to abandon the free trade agreement between the two 
member states. 
Section III will review the current combination of exchange rate systems in order to 
assess whether major incompatibilities affecting the sustainability of free trade agreements are 
present in the region. 
 
III.  CAN A FREE TRADE AREA FOR THE AMERICAS BE SUSTAINABLE?  
        A  BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS 
 
This section briefly analyzes whether the sustainability conditions discussed above are met in the 
LAC region. The analysis is not meant to be exhaustive and will not cover all countries in the 
region due to lack of data readily available. Instead, the analysis is intended to shed light on the 
additional efforts that some countries in the region need to undertake if a free trade area, such as 
the FTAA, is going to become a permanent arrangement.  
 
Are Public Debts Sustainable in Latin America? 
To derive an assessment of public debt sustainability in Latin America, let us start by considering 
the first component of public debt sustainability discussed in section II, namely, a country’s 
capacity to service its debt. A recent study by Ghezzi et al (2001) estimates the structural primary 
fiscal balances needed to achieve sustainable public debts in several Latin American countries. 














                                                            
22.  Using this concept is irrelevant for Argentina at this stage as the government defaulted on its debt in 
late 2001 and, at the time of this writing, there was no clear resolution process under way.   15
Table 2   Primary Fiscal Balances Needed to Achieve Sustainable Public Debts  
                in Selected Latin American Countries (percent of GDP) 
 
    Brazil  Colombia  Ecuador  Mexico  Peru  Venezuela 
Primary balance in 2000  3.1  0.7  7.6  1.5  -0.8  4.1 
  Temporary  1.0  0.6  3.5
1  0.8  -0.3  6.0
1 
  Structural  2.1  0.1  4.1  0.7  -0.5  -1.9 
               
Sustainable structural  
primary balance  2.1  2.0  6.2  1.4  0.9  1.8 
               
Required adjustment over the 
medium-term   0.0  1.9  2.1  0.7  1.4  3.7 
of which:             
  in 2001  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.6  n.a.  n.a. 
  Medium-term gap  0.0  1.1  4.1  0.1  n.a.  n.a. 
 
1.  Entirely due to high oil prices. 
Source: Ghezzi et al. (2001). 
 
The methodology in table 2 involves three steps to assess debt sustainability from the 
perspective of a country’s capacity to service its debt. In the first step the sustainable “structural” 
primary balance is estimated for each country based on assumptions about “long term” rates of 
growth and interest rates.  The estimated structural primary balance ensures that the public debt 
will be sustainable; that is, that the ratio of debt to GDP will remain constant over time. In the 
second step, the observed primary balance in 2000 is decomposed into its temporary and 
structural components. The temporary component of the primary balance is defined as those net 
revenues attributable to the business cycle and commodity fluctuations.
23 Finally, the third step 
calculates the “required adjustment” over the medium term to achieve debt sustainability. This 
adjustment is calculated by subtracting the actual structural primary balance in 2000 from the 
sustainable structural primary balance.   
From the sole perspective of a country’s capacity to pay, table 2 shows that out of the 
sample countries, Brazil and Mexico were on sustainable public debt paths by end-2001. In the 
case of Brazil, by the end of 2001, the projected (both by the government and by market 
specialists) primary surpluses of 3.5 percent of GDP from 2001 onwards appeared to be sufficient 
to maintain the fiscal stance in order.
24 During the same period, Mexico was also moving towards 
a sustainable path. By end-2000, the required adjustment over the medium-term to achieve debt 
sustainability was 0.7 percent of GDP, and the gap was projected to almost close by end-2001. 
                                                            
23.  For a detailed step-by-step methodology, see Ghezzi et al. (2001).   16
The rest of the countries in the sample showed less optimistic results. While the Colombian and 
the Peruvian cases were unclear (namely, there was important uncertainties about the evolution of 
the fiscal stance), the cases of Ecuador and Venezuela were rather worrisome. Both countries 
required significant adjustment in the structural primary balance over the medium-term to achieve 
debt sustainability (2.1 percent for Ecuador and 3.7 for Venezuela).
25 By end-2001, neither 
country, however, showed progress toward achieving such an adjustment.
26   
  As discussed in section II, analyses of debt sustainability solely based on a country’s 
capacity to pay are incomplete and insufficient to assess whether, indeed, a country is “free of 
debt problems.” Also as discussed in section II, Brazil is a case in point. While in mid-2002, 
Brazil continued to maintain primary fiscal surpluses at levels equal or above those necessary to 
achieve a sustainable debt path (from the perspective of its capacity to pay), the markets lost 
confidence about the willingness of future governments to maintain the required fiscal primary 
surplus and/or to transfer the resources from those surpluses toward servicing the debt.  Chart 2a 
compares the evolution of markets’ forecasts for 2002 Brazil’s fiscal primary surpluses with that 
of the spread on Brazil’s sovereign bonds. Clearly, one could not blame the sharp increase in 
spreads on the fiscal stance, as forecasts about the primary surplus for 2002 signaled an 
improvement of the fiscal stance during the current government. Chart 2b compares the spreads 
with electoral poll results. As the probability of an electoral win for Mr. da Silva increased, the 
spreads increased. Thus, the high spreads for Brazil in mid-2002 were not driven by expectations 
of the current government deviating from a stability path but by fears about a “change of course” 
of a potential future government. 
   As a benchmark, the evolution of Mexico’s bond spreads is also presented in chart 2b. 
From the perspective of both its “capacity to pay” (table 2) and markets’ perception about 






     
                                                                                                                                                                             
24. By June 2002, market participants revised upwards the expected primary fiscal surplus for the entire 
2002.  
25. Calculations for Ecuador presented in table 2 differ somewhat from those in Ghezzi et al. (2001) as I 














Sources: Bloomberg, Datafolha, Deutsche Bank. 
 
  This experience shows that the “credibility” of sustained fiscal balances remains 
extremely fragile in Latin America. While this is not the place to elaborate further on this issue, 
the lesson that I derive is that additional research is needed in order to determine whether a  
country is on a sustainable path. If the “required fiscal surplus” for debt sustainability is “too 
high” it may lose credibility in the presence of adverse shocks, including political uncertainties. 
  Whether Brazil will be forced to adjust its fiscal stance considerably was an unknown at 
the time of writing. But with sources of finance curtailed, a potential adjustment may induce 
certain groups to call for an increase in import tariffs. This indeed happened in Chile at the end of 
June 2002, when this country’s businessmen leaders asked their government for the “suspension” 
of Chile’s participation in Mercosur. Fear of contagion and loss of market credibility were 
explicitly stated as the reasons for this request. In sum, based on estimates about countries’ 
capacity to service their debt on a sustainable basis and markets’ perceptions about countries’ 
creditworthiness, by mid-2002, only Mexico (out the seven countries sampled
27) could contribute 
to a stable free trade area. By comparing these results with those from the studies surveyed in this 
paper, it is evident that there is agreement with respect to two countries: Mexico is “ready” (in 
Schott’s terminology) to both join a free trade area and to contribute to its sustainability. By 
contrast, Ecuador is far from being a good candidate. Major discrepancies, however, arise with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
26. While data on Venezuela is not available, indicators suggest that fiscal conditions have deteriorated in 
2001. 
Chart 2b. Brazil Electoral Polls and Spreads on 
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respect to Argentina and Venezuela. In Schott (2001), these countries earn high rankings 
(position 7 for Argentina and position 10 for Venezuela out of 32). This contrasts severely with 
my findings. From the perspective of debt sustainability, both Argentina and Venezuela are far 
from being in a position where they could succeed in a free trade agreement on a sustainable 
basis. Because the WEF study does not incorporate market perceptions’ about a country’s 
creditworthiness, Brazil gets a high score in their assessment. 
 
Are Exchange Rate Arrangements in the LAC Region Compatible with a Free Trade Area? 
Table 3 presents the exchange rate arrangements in the Americas in mid-2001. There are two 
central features of these exchange rate systems. First, as the table shows, the variety of exchange 
rate systems is very large including everything from flexible exchange rates, such as those of 
Chile and Mexico, to the extreme case of fixity?dollarization, such as Ecuador and Panama. 
Second, most countries in LAC have not kept a given exchange rate arrangement for a 
significantly long period of time (say, over a decade). A stylized fact in the region is that not only 
exchange rates but also exchange rate systems are quite volatile. This is illustrated in appendix II. 
In section II, I discussed the incompatibility between the exchange rate systems in 
Mercosur (between Brazil and Argentina) during the period 1999-2001, given (a) the deep 
economic and financial problems that Argentina faced during that period and (b) the important 
concentration of trade between these two countries. Here, I will briefly examine whether there 
exist in the region other forms of exchange rate system incompatibilities that may jeopardize the 
sustainability of free trade agreements. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27. Argentina is included in the non-performing group.   19
  
Table 3  Exchange Rate Arrangements in the Americas 
 
Country   Exchange rate arrangement 
Antigua and Barbuda   ECCU - pegged to the US dollar 
Argentina   Managed float 
Bahamas, The   Fixed against US dollar 
Barbados   Fixed against US dollar 
Belize   Fixed peg 
Bolivia   Managed float 
Brazil   Independently floating with inflation targeting 
Canada   Independently floating with inflation targeting 
Chile   Independently floating with inflation targeting 
Colombia   Independently floating with inflation targeting 
Costa Rica   Crawling peg 
Dominican Republic   Managed float 
Dominica   ECCU - pegged to the US dollar 
Ecuador   Dollarized 
El Salvador   Dollarized 
Grenada   ECCU - pegged to the US dollar 
Guatemala   Managed float 
Guyana   Independently floating with monetary aggregate target 
Haiti   Independently floating 
Honduras   Exchange rate regime within crawling band 
Jamaica   Managed floating with monetary aggregate target 
Mexico   Independently floating, monetary aggregate target 
Nicaragua   Crawling peg 
Panama   Dollarized 
Paraguay   Managed floating 
Peru   Independently floating with monetary aggregate target. 
St. Kitts and Nevis   ECCU - pegged to the US dollar 
St. Lucia   ECCU - pegged to the US dollar 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines   ECCU - pegged to the US dollar 
Suriname   Pegged exchange rate with horizontal band 
Trinidad and Tobago   De facto fixed pegged 
Uruguay   Managed float 
USA   Independently floating 
Venezuela   Managed float 
    
ECCU = Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. 
Source: IMF. 
 
I start with the Andean Community (AC). In this group, Ecuador stands out for having a 
very different exchange rate system than its trading partners in the AC: Ecuador has recently 
dollarized. Some analysts have argued that this may create problems for the sustainability of the 
AC and for further efforts towards a free trade area involving all countries in the Americas. In 
what follows I argue that, because of Ecuador’s trade patterns with countries in the AC, and with 
the rest of LAC, most of those fears are unfounded at present.    20
 
Table 4  Trade between Regional Trading Partners (percent of total trade) 
 
  Partner Region          
Reporting Region  FTAA  NAFTA  Mercosur* 
Andean 
Community  CACM  Caricom 
Rest of 
world 
Central America  70.75  52.31  1.43  4.34  11.82  0.84  29.25 
Caricom  70.35  54.74  1.30  5.55  1.61  7.14  29.65 
Andean   
Community  64.87  44.80  7.72  9.95  1.90  0.50  35.13 
NAFTA  51.96  46.90  1.84  1.63  0.89  0.69  48.04 
Mercosur*  51.11  23.73  22.94  3.83  0.34  0.28  48.89 
                            Key:      = trade within same region       
      = most important trading region       
                             * =  including Chile. 
                          Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (2001). 
 
 
Table 4 shows trade between regional trading partners (as percentage of total 
trade). Trade between countries in the AC is very small (less than 10 percent of total 
trade of the AC takes place within the Community). In the case of Ecuador, the share of 
the AC in its total trade is about 15 percent and the share of Ecuador in each individual 
partner in the AC in no case reaches more than 10 percent. Indeed, the United States is 
Ecuador’s major trading partner (see appendix III). 
Another important feature of trade in the AC is that the share of commodities in exports 
is extremely high in all countries, with Ecuador displaying the highest ratio in the region: 90 
percent (see chart 3). During the last decade, only Bolivia, among Andean countries, has managed 
to significantly reduce this ratio. As a result, this trade area, in general, and Ecuador in particular, 
is very sensitive to commodity shocks and the business cycles of the partner countries tend to 
move together. 
The trade characteristics of Ecuador described above minimize two potential forms of 
risk to the stability of a free trade area. The first potential risk arises from “common adverse 
external shocks” (such as a terms of trade shock) impinging on the AC. Facing an adverse shock, 
currencies in the AC, other than Ecuador, would tend to depreciate.
28 This depreciation of 
currencies in the AC would reduce the competitiveness of Ecuador’s goods and services that 
compete internationally with similar products exported by AC countries. While in theory, this 
                                                            
28. With the exception of Ecuador, all the other countries in the AC maintain a floating exchange rate 
regime.   21
effect could be important, it is not in reality due to the high participation of petroleum and other 
commodities in Ecuador’s exports. This feature implies that a depreciated currency of a partner 
country within the AC—or for that matter within a free trade area encompassing all countries in 
LAC— will not have a significant effect on Ecuador’s revenues from exports.           22
 
Chart 3
Commodity Exports as a Percentage of Total Exports
By Trade Area
Source: World Bank, WDI 2001





































Barbados Belize Dominica Dominican Republic Grenada Haiti Jamaica St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. Vincent and the
Grenadines













Mexico Canada United States
1990*
1999*  23
A second risk arises from the potential contagion effects from one country to another 
through trade links. The argument is that if a country enters a recession, the corresponding 
decrease in aggregate demand would hurt exports from partner countries. Once again, this 
potentially important risk to the stability of the AC is not relevant because of the very small 
percentage of intra-community trade. Going back to the case of Ecuador, while Colombia is 
Ecuador’s most important trading partner within the AC, its share only reaches 8 percent of total 
trade. To be blunt, significant differences in exchange rate systems within the AC are not relevant 
to the stability of the trade agreement because trade within the community is very limited.
29  
This, of course, does not speak very favorably about the overall relevance of the AC.   
My conclusion is, therefore, that as long as Ecuador’s exports continue to be  
concentrated in commodities with its overall trade patterns oriented more towards industrial 
countries rather than LAC, its choice of exchange rate system will not create a threat to the 
stability of a trade area. It is interesting to note, however, that if the proposed FTAA significantly 
increases trade among LAC countries and also contributes to diversifying the basket of exports, 
dollarization in Ecuador may actually become an issue, similar to that faced by Mercosur in 1999-
2001.
30 
Turning to the Central America Common Market (CACM), it is interesting to note that 
the trade area shares some similarities with the AC. First, the intra-area trade is very small: 12 
percent (see table 4). Second, with the exception of Costa Rica, the dependence on commodity 
exports is very large (over 50 percent). Third, the two dollarized economies in the trade area, 
Panama and El Salvador largely trade with the United States and with “the rest of the world.” 
However, a significant difference between the AC and the CACM is that the latter is much more 
“open” in terms of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. While, by 1999, this ratio reached 
about 85 percent in the CACM, the ratio was only around 40 percent in the AC.  Another 
important difference with AC is that several countries within CACM compete with each other 
(and with Mexico) in the “maquila sector” (largely the textile industry). 
 Largely because of the small size of these economies and the small proportion of intra-
trade, no incompatibilities can be found between the different exchange rate regimes in CACM 
that could pose a threat to the stability of a trade agreement. None of the countries in this group 
can gain much by raising tariffs to a partner in CACM and even less to a partner within an FTAA. 
                                                            
29.  This conclusion also applies to a trade agreement with other LAC countries as trade between the AC 
and the rest of LAC is also limited. 
30. This problem would arise if, as a result of trade liberalization, Ecuador’s trade with a few LAC 
countries increases significantly. In that situation, a “bad economic outcome” in Ecuador leading to a loss   24
  Similarly, the size of individual countries within the Caribbean Common Market 
(Caricom) reduces the importance of the choice of exchange rate regime for the sustainability of 
trade agreements.
31  The coexistence of a group of countries sharing the same currency with a 
single Central Bank with countries that have chosen a more flexible exchange rate arrangement 
does not generate incompatibilities that may threaten the FTAA.   
  Finally, I now turn to examine NAFTA. Based on the success of the trade arrangement 
between Mexico and the United States, a number of analysts have argued that Mexico could 
benefit even further from dollarizing its economy. Instead, I would argue that NAFTA has 
worked precisely because Mexico has followed a flexible exchange rate system.  
  Interestingly enough, NAFTA shares an important feature with Mercosur: as in the case 
of Mercosur, partners within NAFTA trade significantly among themselves, albeit with different 
orders of magnitude.
32 This implies that an adverse economic outcome in the United States hurts 
Mexico through reduced exports or a decrease in capital inflows.
33 As discussed above, the same 
is true in Mercosur: a recession in Brazil hurts Argentina and conversely.  
The key difference between the two systems, however, is that NAFTA has avoided 
“stresses” similar to those in Mercosur partly by maintaining a flexible exchange rate system 
since 1995.
34 The flexibility of the exchange rate implies that Mexico has a tool to improve its 
competitiveness in the face of an adverse shock. If US consumers and investors decrease their 
demand for Mexican products, or if international investors reverse financial inflow to Mexico, the 
country can improve its competitiveness through a depreciated exchange rate. This is a more 
efficient and effective tool to improve Mexico’s trade balance with the United States than 
increasing tariffs since Mexico’s chosen motor of growth—trade integration—does not need to be 
disturbed by temporary fluctuations in the US business cycle or by sudden reversals of capital 
inflows.
35 The exchange rate arrangements create an incentive for the sustainability of free trade 
areas.
36 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in competitiveness relative to its trading partners may generate pressures for the Ecuadorian authorities to 
increase tariffs (since the exchange rate cannot move to offset the loss in competitiveness). 
31. Notice that I am not discussing about the “appropriateness” of the exchange rate system for economic 
stability. I am just dealing with the issue as to whether a certain choice of exchange rate regime could 
create incentives to deviate from a free trade area. 
32. As discussed above, none of the other trade agreements share this feature. 
33. The converse is not necessarily true for the United States given the relative economic size of this 
economy. 
34. The absence of a debt problem in Mexico, discussed above, has also contributed to the stability of 
NAFTA. 
35. In spite of the US recession in 2001, Mexico did not need to depreciate its currency because of the 
sustained foreign direct investment—a by-product of NAFTA—towards that country. 
36. Of course, the relative size of the partners matters significantly. While an adverse shock in the United 
States would, most likely, have a severe effect on Mexico, the converse is not true. The sustainability of the   25
These brief remarks lead me to conclude that, currently, there are few incompatibilities 
between exchange rate systems and a sustainable free trade area in the Americas. With a low 
probability, dollarization in Ecuador could become a problem if the free trade area were to result 
in a concentration of trade with a few partners in LAC. For the rest of the small dollarized 
countries in the region, the sheer small size of the trade with one another makes their choice of 
exchange rate systems less relevant for the stability of a potential FTAA. 
 
IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has focused on identifying preconditions that would ensure the sustainability of a free 
trade agreement in the Americas. The issue can be bluntly put as follows: even if negotiations for 
an FTAA were to be finalized by 2005 what guarantees that such an arrangement would be 
permanent? After all, the LAC region is full of experiments of trade negotiations, that after a 
short period of enthusiasm were eventually either abandoned or given a very low priority in the 
policy agenda. 
 The paper argues that the macro, micro, and political conditions advanced in the 
literature to measure a country’s ability to compete internationally, while necessary, are not 
sufficient to ensure the success and permanence of trade agreements. Instead, two additional 
financial conditions are needed. The first is that each partner in the free trade area needs to have 
sustainable public debts as determined by the achievement of credible and sustainable structural 
fiscal balances. The second is that exchange rate regimes across trading partners should be 
compatible in the sense that adverse shocks in one country do not generate a policy dilemma in 
other partners between abandoning their exchange rate system or the free trade area.  
  A preliminary analysis of the evidence in the LAC region shows the importance of these 
two preconditions. An analysis of debt sustainability, regarding countries’ capacity to pay as well 
as markets’ perceptions about governments’ willingness to service their obligations, reveals that a 
number of countries in the region need to deal with potential solvency problems before reaching 
the status of credible partners in a regional trade arrangement. While Argentina is already 
deemed as insolvent, countries such as Ecuador and Venezuela rank high on the list of countries 
where the issue of debt sustainability can become a serious problem. Not resolving this issue 
before reaching a regional trade agreement can threaten its stability. An interesting case is Brazil, 
where, by mid-2002, markets lost credibility about the willingness of a prospective future 
government to continue with the fiscal adjustment needed for debt sustainability. This in spite the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
trade agreement, therefore, relies significantly on the capacity of Mexico to conduct policy actions that 
“shield” the country against adverse shocks originated in its major trading partner.   26
fact that exercises of debt sustainability, from the perspective of Brazil’s capacity to pay, show 
that the current government has entered a stability path.   
The examination of the compatibility of exchange rate systems across trading partners is 
also very revealing. Part of the success of NAFTA since the late 1990s and the “impasse” of 
Mercosur during the period 1999-2001, had to do with the choices of exchange rate regimes. In 
both trade areas, the share of trade between partners is very high, and in NAFTA, this includes 
significant financial transactions. This implies that economic and financial developments in one 
partner can severely affect the others. While Mexico was able to use the flexibility of the 
exchange rate to improve competitiveness following the sharp decline of portfolio flows from US 
investors into Mexico following the Asian and Russian crises, Argentina had no mechanisms to 
deal with an adverse shock from Brazil (such as a depreciation of the Real in 1999). From this 
perspective, the recent move of Argentina towards a more flexible exchange rate system is good 
news for a sustainable free trade area. 
  Does this mean that flexible exchange systems are needed in all countries for the success 
of free trade areas in the region? Not necessarily, smaller countries with small trade dependence 
on individual partners can afford to have a fixed exchange rate system. That is the case in CACM 
and Caricom, where a variety of very different exchange rate arrangements coexist (including 
dollarized countries) without threatening the stability of the trade agreements. For a free trade 
area including all countries in the Americas to be successful, it is necessary that the small 
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Panama 1 Chile 1
Trinidad & Tobago 2 Paraguay 1
Chile 3 Dominican Republic 1
Costa Rica 4 Trinidad & Tobago 1
Venezuela 5 Panama 1
Mexico 6 Mexico 6
El Salvador 7 Venezuela, RB 6
Honduras 8 Costa Rica 6
Paraguay 9 El Salvador 6
Brazil 10 Uruguay 10




Jamaica 13 Honduras 10
Guatemala 14 Guatemala 14
Colombia 15 Argentina 15
Nicaragua 16 Bolivia 15
Uruguay 17 Colombia 17
Peru 18 Nicaragua 18
Argentina 19 Brazil 19
Bolivia 20 Ecuador 20
* The rankings have been adjusted to ease comparisons.
Sources: World Economic Forum (2001); Schott (2001).Appendix II
Evolution of Exchange Rate Systems* in Selected Latin American Countries 1970-2000
1970-74 1975-79 1980-94 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-02
Argentina peg crawling peg adjustable peg managed float peg; currency board currency board;
currency board dual exchange rates;
manged float
Bolivia peg peg peg float float float; managed float
managed float
Brazil exchange rate exchange rate mini devaluations mini devaluations managed peg band; float
indexed to inflation indexed to inflation based on price based on price float
(real exchange rate (real exchange rate differentials differentials
targeting) targeting)
Chile peg crawling peg; peg; crawling peg peg; band; float
peg crawling peg crawling peg crawling band;
float
Colombia crawling peg crawling peg crawling peg crawling peg crawling peg fixed band; float
exchange rate band crawling band
Ecuador dual exchange rate dual exchange rate multiple exchange  multiple exchange  dual exchange rate dual exchange rate dollarization
system system rate markets rate markets system system;
dollarization
Mexico peg peg peg; managed peg crawling peg; float float
managed peg float
Peru peg peg peg peg float float float
Venezuela peg peg peg multiple exchange  managed peg peg; crawling band, float
rate markets bands;
crawling band
Sources: IMF: Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various issues); Jeffry Frieden and Ernesto Stein, eds. (2001):
The Currency Game Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America. 
* System reported is the predominant during the period considered.Appendix III  Trade with Partner (percent of total trade)
Partner Country
Reporting Country FTAA Nafta Canada Mexico US Mercosur Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay
Andean 





Central America 70.75 52.31 1.43 4.34 11.82
El Salvador 78.85 54.25 1.57 3.81 48.86 1.03 0.17 0.61 0.24 0.00 0.00 2.83 0.00 0.36 1.42 0.08 0.97 19.91 3.60 0.00 10.06
Honduras 76.38 66.40 0.61 2.61 63.18 0.60 0.07 0.39 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.48 0.12 0.06 0.45 7.36 0.60 1.78 0.97
Guatemala 74.09 52.93 1.88 6.62 44.43 1.64 0.39 0.83 0.39 0.00 0.03 4.10 0.00 0.80 0.38 0.27 2.65 14.35 3.81 7.41 0.00
Nicaragua 70.94 42.50 1.85 4.84 35.81 0.87 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.00 0.02 7.03 0.01 0.23 0.27 0.08 6.45 19.61 8.54 0.00 5.87
Panama 65.89 40.27 1.04 3.78 35.45 2.05 0.45 0.92 0.67 0.00 0.02 14.70 0.02 2.99 5.95 0.29 5.45 8.09 3.83 0.90 2.00
Costa Rica 61.82 47.19 1.31 3.47 42.42 1.95 0.38 1.14 0.41 0.00 0.02 3.87 0.00 1.02 0.14 0.12 2.59 8.17 0.00 1.94 2.71
Caricom 70.35 54.74 1.30 5.55 1.61
Dominican Republic 85.45 73.65 0.54 3.11 70.00 1.04 0.17 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.06 7.42 0.00 0.54 0.08 0.07 6.72 2.01 0.31 0.09 0.20
Haiti 81.64 63.51 1.60 0.51 61.40 3.10 1.16 1.29 0.52 0.00 0.13 2.14 0.00 1.80 0.03 0.30 0.00 1.56 0.00 0.04 1.08
Trinidad & Tobago 79.01 44.84 1.82 1.65 41.37 1.51 0.14 1.25 0.07 0.00 0.04 13.08 0.00 3.74 0.21 0.17 8.96 2.64 0.33 0.52 0.64
Grenada 75.18 44.36 1.50 0.00 42.86 3.65 0.45 3.12 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.06
St. Kitts & Nevis 74.36 57.39 4.37 0.00 53.02 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dominica 72.41 33.08 3.13 0.56 29.39 0.56 0.01 0.52 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.31 0.04 0.00 1.36 1.46 0.53 0.00 0.46
St. Vincent & Gren. 70.14 32.39 2.37 0.28 29.74 0.82 0.05 0.76 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.06 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.76 1.61 0.18 0.01 0.25
Belize 70.07 59.72 1.98 6.83 50.92 0.92 0.24 0.67 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.38 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.03 1.20 4.35 0.27 0.93 1.91
Jamaica 69.42 52.40 5.15 3.60 43.66 1.37 0.12 1.05 0.12 0.00 0.07 3.38 0.00 0.48 0.02 0.07 2.81 1.62 0.48 0.02 0.22
St. Lucia 69.23 33.71 1.85 0.00 31.86 13.36 0.07 13.13 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Barbados 67.14 38.67 3.29 0.23 35.15 2.39 0.10 2.08 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.20 1.30 0.31 0.02 0.65
Guyana 53.99 38.88 11.84 0.00 27.04 0.50 0.02 0.43 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.59 0.00 0.24 0.33 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Suriname 44.88 31.55 4.17 0.00 27.38 0.94 0.12 0.78 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.44 0.00 0.37 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.08 0.00 0.14
Bahamas, The 35.55 32.71 0.62 1.13 30.96 0.74 0.02 0.67 0.05 0.00 0.01 1.05 0.00 0.64 0.01 0.41 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.23 0.01
Antigua & Barbuda 12.59 9.78 0.86 0.00 8.92 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Andean Community 64.87 44.80 7.72 9.95 1.90
Bolivia 76.96 18.63 0.73 1.54 16.36 40.74 13.31 19.54 7.54 0.21 0.13 17.49 0.00 8.26 3.53 5.58 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.01
Colombia 72.75 47.74 1.79 3.15 42.80 5.94 0.82 3.20 1.81 0.02 0.09 15.34 0.99 0.00 3.16 2.09 9.10 2.05 0.54 0.10 0.31
Ecuador 66.24 38.51 1.62 2.03 34.87 8.30 2.23 1.72 4.17 0.05 0.12 15.57 1.10 8.32 0.00 2.42 3.73 3.54 0.15 0.58 0.38
Venezuela, RB 62.46 49.32 1.41 1.86 46.05 5.48 0.56 3.90 0.86 0.02 0.14 5.96 0.01 3.90 0.69 1.36 0.00 1.70 0.68 0.13 0.50
Peru 56.80 33.59 2.20 2.56 28.83 11.70 1.81 3.87 5.59 0.09 0.33 9.46 1.01 3.52 1.58 0.00 3.35 1.59 0.12 0.04 0.17
Nafta 51.96 46.90 1.84 1.63 0.89
Mexico 85.35 82.53 2.17 0.00 80.36 1.31 0.16 0.70 0.39 0.00 0.06 0.66 0.01 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.60 0.14 0.07 0.18
Canada 79.28 78.01 0.00 1.84 76.17 0.57 0.08 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.27 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.04
United States 38.70 32.22 20.09 12.13 0.00 2.28 0.40 1.47 0.35 0.02 0.04 2.13 0.02 0.54 0.17 0.19 1.20 1.15 0.31 0.18 0.23
Mercosur 51.11 23.73 22.94 3.83 0.34
Paraguay 74.29 13.29 0.13 0.29 12.86 60.04 24.37 30.44 2.73 0.00 2.50 0.94 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uruguay 63.34 12.86 1.45 2.19 9.22 46.10 21.64 20.77 2.00 1.69 0.00 3.76 0.06 0.25 0.22 0.36 2.87 0.26 0.06 0.01 0.05
Argentina 57.68 17.55 0.80 1.08 15.67 37.21 0.00 26.30 6.38 1.89 2.64 2.55 0.79 0.37 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.02 0.07
Chile 48.77 24.56 2.11 4.07 18.38 17.29 10.06 6.55 0.00 0.33 0.35 6.28 0.56 1.27 1.16 1.96 1.33 0.49 0.15 0.05 0.11
Brazil 47.49 27.10 1.49 2.15 23.46 15.88 11.66 0.00 1.96 1.03 1.22 3.76 0.44 0.82 0.13 0.50 1.88 0.35 0.13 0.04 0.07
- trade within same region
- major trading partner
Source: IMF: Direction of Trade December 2001Appendix III (continued)
Partner Country
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Tobago Rest of world
Central America 0.84 29.25
El Salvador 3.78 1.99 0.47 0.83 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 21.15
Honduras 0.00 3.63 0.37 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.45 23.62
Guatemala 0.92 1.43 0.77 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.35 25.91
Nicaragua 4.25 0.00 0.95 0.93 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 29.06
Panama 0.77 0.58 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 34.11
Costa Rica 1.01 1.44 1.07 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 38.18
Caricom 7.14 29.65
Dominican Republic 0.15 0.04 1.21 1.33 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.35 14.55
Haiti 0.00 0.18 0.26 11.34 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 9.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.77 18.36
Trinidad & Tobago 0.72 0.25 0.20 16.94 0.27 0.42 3.36 0.14 0.32 1.45 0.71 1.45 0.44 5.10 0.36 0.83 0.57 1.52 0.00 20.99
Grenada 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.88 0.80 0.06 4.07 0.00 0.73 0.26 0.00 1.06 0.00 0.88 0.08 1.82 0.81 0.14 16.16 24.82
St. Kitts & Nevis 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.40 0.00 0.01 3.65 0.00 1.14 0.22 0.09 0.41 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.20 0.00 8.91 25.64
Dominica 0.06 0.00 0.40 35.60 2.31 0.09 3.58 0.01 0.00 0.69 1.00 2.52 0.01 7.21 1.27 1.98 1.39 0.24 13.29 27.59
St. Vincent and Gren. 0.63 0.00 0.54 34.26 1.43 0.03 5.39 0.05 1.18 0.28 0.96 1.86 0.01 1.29 1.24 2.15 0.00 0.01 18.39 29.86
Belize 0.76 0.03 0.44 3.70 0.05 0.04 0.55 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.44 29.93
Jamaica 0.18 0.00 0.72 10.65 0.06 0.11 0.54 0.21 0.35 0.36 0.05 0.81 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.17 7.59 30.58
St. Lucia 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.68 0.00 0.01 5.43 0.03 0.92 0.20 1.19 0.58 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.00 1.15 0.05 11.47 30.77
Barbados 0.24 0.00 0.08 24.29 0.71 0.23 0.00 0.26 0.60 0.28 0.86 1.40 0.08 2.24 0.67 1.86 0.98 0.82 13.31 32.86
Guyana 0.00 0.08 0.05 13.89 0.49 0.00 1.38 0.07 0.44 0.03 0.22 0.00 0.00 2.82 0.08 0.20 0.31 0.75 7.11 46.01
Suriname 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.72 0.04 0.01 1.03 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.87 0.04 0.74 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 8.65 55.12
Bahamas, The 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 64.45
Antigua & Barbuda 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.71 0.00 0.01 0.54 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.12 0.35 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.94 87.41
Andean Community 0.50 35.13
Bolivia 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 23.04
Colombia 0.16 0.02 0.91 1.68 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.90 27.25
Ecuador 0.05 0.02 2.35 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 33.76
Venezuela, RB 0.07 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.54
Peru 0.03 0.01 1.22 0.46 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 43.20
Nafta 0.69 48.04
Mexico 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 14.65
Canada 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 20.72
United States 0.29 0.05 0.10 0.92 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.44 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.17 61.30
Mercosur 0.28 48.89
Paraguay 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.71
Uruguay 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 36.66
Argentina 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 42.32
Chile 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 51.23
Brazil 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.39 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.12 52.51